Minds without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of Concepts
Jerry A. Fodor, Zenon W. PylyshynTwo prominent thinkers argue for the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference to be concepts' sole semantic property.
Fodor and Pylyshyn determine that all of these proposals share a commitment to a two-factor theory of conceptual content, which holds that the content of a concept consists of its sense together with its reference. Fodor and Pylyshyn argue instead that there is no conclusive case against the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference as their sole semantic property. Such a theory, if correct, would provide for the naturalistic account of content that cognitive science lacks—and badly needs. Fodor and Pylyshyn offer a sketch of how this theory might be developed into an account of perceptual reference that is broadly compatible with empirical findings and with the view that the mental processes effecting perceptual reference are largely preconceptual, modular, and encapsulated.
Kategorije:
Godina:
2015
Izdavač:
The MIT Press
Jezik:
english
Strane:
193
ISBN 10:
0262027909
ISBN 13:
9780262027908
Fajl:
PDF, 4.79 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2015
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